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Not Twice for the Same: How the Dual
Sovereignty Doctrine is Used to
Circumvent Non Bis In Idem
ABSTRACT

Today, it is quite possible for a criminal defendant who
has violated the laws of several countries with one criminal
act to be subject to multiple prosecutions. In situations
where two countries share concurrent criminaljurisdiction,it
is unclear whether the defendant would be able to rely on
some level of double jeopardy protection. International law
currently does not obligate a sovereign state to recognize
another state's penal judgments, thus allowing states to
prosecute a defendant regardless of any legal action that
may have been previously taken against the defendant.
Several countries, however, have chosen to provide
defendants with at least some level of double jeopardy
protection. In the internationalrealm, the prohibitionagainst
multiple prosecutions for the same offense is cited as the
maxim non bis in idem.
Despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States providesfor such protection
against sequential prosecutions, the United States does not
extend this protection to defendants who have been
prosecuted in anothersovereign state. Under the judiciallyconstructed dual sovereignty doctrine, U.S. courts allow
separatesovereigns to seek redressfor violations of their law
independent of any action that may have been previously
taken by another affected sovereign. It is this doctrine that
the U.S. courts cite in choosing not to recognize non bis in
idem as a binding principle of internationallaw, but rather
as a protection that may be provided only by treaty in cases
of extradition. Often times, however, defendants are left with
little or no protection even with operative treaty provisions.
This note considers the issues and implications
presented by the United States' use of the dual sovereignty
doctrine in permitting multiple prosecutions. It will fuirther
discuss how U.S. courts have counteracted non bis in idem
even in the presence of a treaty provision. Finally, this note
will propose a standard that provides the United States with
an avenue with which to vindicate its interests while at the
same time subjecting the defendant to a single trial.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As more and more crime begins to transcend national
borders in the new millennium, nation-states will find themselves
sharing concurrent criminal jurisdiction with other states over
the same defendants. In such cases, the problem is that a
defendant who has violated the laws of several states may be
subject to multiple prosecution. The question then becomes: to
what extent is that defendant protected against double jeopardy?1
The problem of concurrent jurisdiction is becoming more
common as certain crimes such as drug trafficking, terrorism,
and genocide have multinational effects. 2 Currently, the general

1.

MARTIN FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 358 (1969).

2.

Under international law, a sovereign may prosecute an offense based

on territorial, personal,

or universal jurisdiction.

INTERNATIONAL CASES AND

MATERIALS 1046-86 (Louis Henkin et. al. eds., 3d ed. 1993).

Non Bis In Idem
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rule in international law does not obligate a sovereign state to
3
Thus, under the
enforce another state's penal judgments.
current state of the law, defendants who engage in these activities
would likely face individual and separate prosecution in each4
sovereign that chooses to exercise its jurisdiction over him.
Although this is within the discretion of local prosecuting
authorities, the fact that sovereigns are free to prosecute those
defendants that may have been previously convicted or acquitted
by another court is troubling under the well-accepted tenets of
both national and international law.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of legal systems have chosen
to provide defendants some level of protection against multiple
prosecutions for the same offense. 5 In the international realm,
6
this prohibition is cited as the maxim non bis in idem and is the
international equivalent to the protection provided by the Double
Despite some
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 7
both double
of
foundation
differences in application, at the
of
considerations
similar
jeopardy and non bis in idem are
8
dignity.
fairness, just treatment, and respect for an individual's
Moreover, the rationale underlying both principles provides that a
state possessing vast and powerful resources should not be
allowed to continually subject a defendant to harassment,
anxiety, and the great expense of defending himself. 9
Even though domestically the idea prohibiting multiple
prosecutions is one our most valued and cherished constitutional
protections, the United States does not extend this protection to
defendants who have previously been prosecuted by another
sovereign state. Further adding to this apparent paradox, the
U.S. Supreme Court has developed a doctrine that expressly
allows for sequential prosecutions in cases where a defendant's

Lara Ballard, The Recognition and Enforcement of InternationalCriminal
3.
CourtJudgments in U.S. Courts,29 CoLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 143, 173 (1997).

4.

See id.

FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 358 (stating that non bis in idem is widely
5.
accepted by individual states with respect to their interstate relations).
6.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1051 (6th ed. 1990) (defming non bis in idem as

"not twice for the same").
U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "[n]or shall any person be subject for
7.
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
See FRIEDLAND, supranote 1, at 358.
8.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
9.
The underlying idea,... is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent
he may be found guilty.
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Known as the

dual sovereignty doctrine, this approach allows each sovereign to
seek independent redress regardless of any legal action that may
have been previously taken by other affected sovereigns. 1 This
approach, which is unfaithful to the protection provided by
double jeopardy, has not been universally adopted.
Instead,
some countries have attempted to remain committed to the
principle of non bis in idem by giving legal effect to other
countries' penal judgments, thereby preventing the injustice of
2
placing a defendant in double jeopardy.'
This note considers and addresses the issues presented by
this system which permits multiple prosecutions. Part II of this
note introduces and discusses the origins of non bis in iderm. Part
III describes how U.S. courts have employed the dual sovereignty
doctrine to counteract the non bis in idem doctrine in both the
presence and absence of an extradition treaty. Part IV evaluates
the reasons why the dual sovereignty doctrine is inequitable and
ineffective at protecting the rights of criminal defendants. Finally,
this note concludes that, despite the Supreme Court's continued
reliance on the dual sovereignty doctrine, the doctrine should be
abandoned in the international realm and substituted with a
more flexible standard that allows sovereigns to cooperate and
jointly prosecute defendants.

II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Rule's Origin
Although the idea that no man shall be twice prosecuted for
the same conduct is a well accepted tenet of American
Constitutional law as well as one of the oldest recognized legal
norms in western civilization, 13 its origin remains a matter of
speculation. 14 Tracing the evolution of this doctrine is difficult at
best. The consensus among writers of antiquity is that the rule

10.
11.

See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 137 (1959).
Id. at 133-34.
12.
FRIEDLAND, supranote 1, at 358-59.
13.
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 151 (Black, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "[fe]ar
and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same conduct is
one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization").
14.
Jill Hunter, The Development of the Rule Against Double Jeopardy, 5 J.
LEGAL HIST. 3, 4 (1984) (delineating the different theories of the origin of double
jeopardy).
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finds its roots in Roman and Greek law. i s According to the Digest
6
of Justinian,1
Roman law required that "the governor must not
allow a man to be charged with the same offense of which he has
already been acquitted." 17 This precept, which did not carry the
same legal force among the Romans as it does in the U.S.
Constitution, eventually developed into the oft-cited Roman law
maxim, nemo bis in idem debet vexari,' 8 or non bis in idem,1 9
which has served as the fundamental principle behind the idea
20
that no man should be tried twice for the same offense.
Whatever its origin, one court has observed that the protection
against double jeopardy "seems to have been always embedded in
the common law of England, as well as in the Roman law, and
doubtless in every other system of jurisprudence, and instead of
21
having a specific origin, it simply always existed."
After the fall of the Roman Empire, the concept of double
jeopardy survived through its solemnization in the canon law22 as
well as through the writings of early Christian authors. 2 3 The
canon law's acceptance of the prohibition of multiple trials for the
same conduct arose primarily in 391 A.D. from St. Jerome's
reading of I Nahum 9 as commanding that "there shall not rise up
a double affliction." 2 4 By 847 A.D., this interpretation supported
the need for a prohibition against double jeopardy, as even the

15.
Hunter, supra note 14, at 4; see also Jay Siegler, A History of Double
Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 283, 284 (1963).
16.
Published in 533 A.D., the Digest of Justinianis a collection of Roman
law drawn from the writings of classical jurists. ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 214 (1991). The Digest of Justinianwas assembled in an effort
to streamline Roman law by removing those laws that were obsolete, redundant,
or contradictory. Id.
17.
Francine Ward, The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1477 (1989) (citing Dig. 48.2.7 (Alan Watson ed. 1985)). In
Roman law, criminal prosecutions were brought by citizens and not the state. See
Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of
Doctrine and Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801,
807 (1985). From its inception, the prohibition against double jeopardy was not
formulated in terms of who brought the charges. Instead, it barred an individual
from repeated accusations under any circumstances. Id.
18.
"No one should be troubled twice for the same matter." In re
Extradition of Montiel Garcia, 802 F.Supp. 773, 777 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
19.
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1054.
20.
Hunter, supranote 14, at 4-5.
21.
Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 744, 756 (Okla. 1913).
22.
The canon law, which began its development at the close of the Roman
Empire, is the body of laws and regulations for the government of the Christian
organization made or adopted by the ecclesiastical authority and included
regulations borrowed from Roman law. Catholic Encyclopedia:
Canon Law,
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09056a.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2000).
23.
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 152 (Black, J., dissenting).
24.
Siegler, supra note 15, at 284 (citing Douay version); see also Bartkus,
359 U.S. at 152 (stating that the King James version of I Nahum 9 reads "affliction
shall not rise up a second time").
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church recognized that even God does not judge an individual
25
twice for the same transgression.
Even with such a strong expression of the principle against
multiple prosecutions, it was not until the dispute between St.
Thomas Becket and Henry II in the twelfth century that the
concept of double jeopardy gained widespread approval. 26 The
controversy surrounded the King's desire to further prosecute
church clerics in civil tribunals who had already been tried and
convicted in the ecclesiastical courts. 27 Relying on the canon law,
Becket objected, arguing that to allow further prosecution would
violate the maxim nemo bis in idipsum--no man ought to be
punished twice for the same offence. " 28
In 1176, following
Becket's martyrdom, Henry conceded that clerics convicted in the
ecclesiastical courts were exempt from further prosecution in the
King's courts. 29 This was a significant event because the King's
court and the ecclesiastical court drew their power from different
sovereigns, thus giving credence to the argument that the focus of
prohibiting successive prosecutions is on the rights of the
30
defendant and not of the prosecutor.
By 1250, the evolving principle of double jeopardy had begun
to emerge in the English common law.3 1
According to one
commentator, the concept was introduced into the common law
through both the canon law traditions and the influence of
Roman law scholars who had traveled to England.3 2 These
scholars influenced jurists and writers who sought to supplement
the English common law with the doctrinal refinements of the
Roman law.3 3 As they were known in England, the prohibitions
against multiple prosecutions began not as fundamental,
substantive principles of English justice, but merely as a
technical parts of criminal procedure.3 4 Specifically, the principle
was incorporated through the common law pleas of autrefois
acquit (otherwise acquitted) and autrefois convict (otherwise

25.
See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 448-49 (2d ed.,
1899); see also Z.N. BROOKE, THE ENGLISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY: FROM THE
CONQUEST TO THE REIGN OF JOHN 204-05 (1931).

26.
27.

See Ward, supra note 17, at 1477.
Id. at 1477-78.
28.
See FRIEDLAND, supranote 1, at 5.
29.
Id.
30.
See Allen & Ratnaswamy, supranote 17, at 806-07.
31.
See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 499 (1978).
32.
See Hunter, supra note 14, at 4. In the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries, there was an influx of Roman law scholars who entered England. Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 4-5 (stating "up to the end of the sixteenth century . . . the
protection remained a mere statement of procedure replete with exceptions and
compromises which would deny it the status of being a fundamental right and a
cornerstone of English justice").
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convicted). 35 These pleas allowed the defendant to avoid a second
prosecution by proving prior acquittal or conviction on the same
charge. 3 6 Despite the existence of these procedural safeguards,
no governing legal document or legal treatise of the time
addressed the substantive principle of double jeopardy.3 7 It was
not until the late nineteenth century that Blackstone recognized
that the plea of autrefois acquit stood as a "universal maxim of the
common law of England" grounded in the idea that "no man is to
be brought into the jeopardy of his life more than once for the
38
same offence."
These early writings by Blackstone and others acted to
influence the development of the law in the United States. 3 9 The
earliest conceptualization of double jeopardy in the United States
began in the Massachusetts colony. 40 Although Massachusetts
law was greatly influenced by the English common law, its
approach to the principle of double jeopardy differed in that it
extended protection to cover not only all criminal prosecutions,
but civil trespasses as well. 4 ' Although it was the first to offer
double jeopardy protection, Massachusetts inexplicably omitted
this protection from its post-revolutionary constitution. 42 Despite
this fact, however, its conceptualization of the protection
influenced other colonies in shaping their own double jeopardy
laws, 4 3 and although many post-revolutionary constitutions did

35.
See Ward, supranote 17, at 1478-79.
36.
Id. at 1479. There were, however, instances where the King's Bench
held that a retrial may be permitted where the first indictment was not complete.

Id.
37.
Id. at 1478. Although the Magna Carta and other legal documents do
not address double jeopardy, works by Glanville and Bracton discuss the
prohibition against multiple prosecutions as it relates to trials by ordeal. Id.
38.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335
(1873).
39.
Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 17, at 807-08. Sir Edmund Coke's
Second Institutes also had a profound influence on the modem understanding of
double jeopardy. Id.
40.
Siegler, supra note 15, at 298.
41.
See THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS 46 (Max Ferrand, ed.,
1929). The Massachusetts double jeopardy clause was listed in the Body of
Liberties of 1641 and read as follows: "No man shall be twice sentenced by civil
justice for one and the same crime, offense, or trespass.' Siegler, supra note 15,
at 299.
42.
Siegler, supra note 15, at 307.
43.
Siegler, supra note 15, at 307-08. Several states addressed double
jeopardy concerns through their constitutions, procedures, and courts. See Ward,
supra note 17, at 1479-81. New Hampshire was the first colony to provide the
protection in its constitution. Id. In the courts of Virginia, New York, and
Connecticut the plea was recognized although it was not listed in their respective
state constitutions. Id.
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not recognize this protection, the plea was recognized by statute
and through the common law.4
During the post-revolutionary period, the principle's growing
acceptance by the colonies led to its inclusion in the Bill of
Rights. 45
The procedural history of the Amendment, however,
provides insight and clues as to the intended extent and
operation of the principle.
After the ratification of the
Constitution, James Madison proposed various amendments to
the Constitution including a provision stating: "No person shall
be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment or trial for the same offense." 4 6 The House rejected
this draft and several other amendments, including one that
proposed inserting the phrase "by any law of the United States"
after the words "same offense." 4 7 The rejection of this version
may at minimum signify that double jeopardy at its inception was
intended to bar federal courts from trying an individual of a crime
for which that individual had already been prosecuted by another
sovereign. 48
Indeed, at least one commentator has recognized
that this rejection may allow "the speculation by negative
inference that double jeopardy may have been intended to apply
49
to the states and the federal government alike."
Following several drafts and much discussion, Congress
approved the final version of the Bill of Rights, which included the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 5 0 As to the
specific meaning of the final text of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, 5 1 there was little debate on the floor of Congress. 5 2 From
the debate that did occur, it may be inferred that the framers
intended to incorporate into the Clause their understanding of the
concept as it existed in the English common law and in the
colonies. 5 3 At that time, the English common law's conception of

44.
Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 17, at 808.
45.
Siegler, supranote 15, at 299-308.
46.
Id. at 304.
47.
Id. at 305.
48.
This view is supported by two early Supreme Court cases. See United
States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (stating that "there can be
no doubt that the plea of autrefois acquit would be good in any civilized State,
though resting on a prosecution instituted in the courts of any other civilized
State"); see also Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276 (1808) (observing that
"ifthe port of St. Domingo had jurisdiction of the case, its sentence is conclusive').
49.
Id.
50.
Allen & Ratnaswamy, supranote 17, at 809.
51.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "[nlor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
52.
Allen & Ratnaswamy, supra note 17, at 809-81 (citing 1 Annals of
Cong. 753 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
53.
Id. at 810; see also Siegler, supra note 15, at 306 (stating that the
clause was intended to be "declaratory of the law as it now stood" and was to
follow the "universal practice in Great Britain and in this country").
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double jeopardy had evolved and was understood to act as a bar
even to successive prosecutions by different sovereigns. 5 4 More
specifically, the English position held that a person who had been
acquitted by a foreign court having competent jurisdiction could
not be retried in an English court.5 5
From this historical perspective, it can be seen that non bis in
idem evolved from its limited beginnings as a principle of justice
to its present state as a recognized right that ensures individuals
are protected from being repeatedly subjected to criminal
prosecution for the same offense regardless of the prosecuting
authority.
B. Non Bis In Idem as an InternationalPrinciple
Today, the principle that no person should be subjected to
more than one trial for the same offense is a well recognized tenet
of American constitutional law that is widely accepted by nearly
all civilized legal systems.5 6 Although the manner in which this
protection is interpreted and provided for varies,5 7 at its core it is
regarded as part of the "universal law of nations."5 8 In the United
States, the prohibition against multiple prosecutions is provided
for by the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.5 9
Many other countries make similar guarantees, but among the
civil law countries, this protection continues to be recognized as
60
the maxim non bis in idem.
Although both non bis in idem and double jeopardy generally
protect one's freedom from multiple prosecutions for the same

54.
FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 360; see also JAY A. SIEGLER, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 121 (1969) [hereinafter
SIEGLER II].
55.
Rex v. Roche, 1 Leach C.C. 134 (1775) (cited in SIEGLER II, supra note
54, at 126). In Rex v. Roche, the defendant was on trial in an English court on the
charge of murder. Id. However, the defendant claimed that he had already been
tried for the same murder in a Dutch court. Id. Although the court did not decide
the case on this plea, it did state if the facts supported the plea, double jeopardy
would bar the second prosecution. Id. For a list of similar English cases see infra
note 68.
56.
See FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 358; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International
Procedural Protection and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 289 (stating that the protection from double jeopardy and
non bis in idem are found in over fifty national constitutions). For a complete list
of these constitutions see id. at 289 n.264.
57.

See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:

UNITED STATES

LAW AND PRACTICE 598 (1996).
58.
SIEGLER II, supranote 54, at 120.
59.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
60.
See Jennifer Costa, Double Jeopardy and Non Bis In Idem: Principlesof
Fairness,4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 181, 182 (1998).
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offense, fine distinctions exist in the operation of the two
concepts. 6 1 The primary difference between the two is that
double jeopardy is usually held to apply to conflicts within a given
62
legal system and not to disputes between separate sovereigns.
Non bis in idern, by contrast, protects an individual from multiple
prosecutions irrespective of the prosecuting authority. 63 While
both vary in their scope and application, 64 both non bis in idem
and double jeopardy embody 65the same core values: fairness and
respect for individual dignity.
Although it is theoretically accepted that non bis in idem
should bar prosecutions for a single offense by separate
66
sovereigns, the functional reality instead reflects the opposite.
On this point, the primary question focuses on the extent to
which a sovereign state is obligated to respect and enforce the
criminal judgment of a foreign court. One view, adopted by
several nations, finds that a previous judgment by a foreign court
will act to bar a successive suit for the same offense in any other
country's courts. 6 7 Early English
and American cases reflect
68
acceptance of this approach.
In contrast, the opposing view holds that in the absence of a
treaty expressly providing otherwise, sovereign states are not
69
obligated to give legal effect to each other's penal judgments.
This position is based on the assumption that when an

61.
Id. at 183; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 359 (observing that
whereas American lawyers speak of double jeopardy and English lawyers refer to
autrefois acquitand autrefois convict, international lawyers use the term non bis in
idem).
62.

See BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 288.

63.
64.

Id.
Id.

65.

FRIEDLAND, supranote 1, at 358.

66.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 598 (observing that "there has always
been a question as to its applicability between the different legal systems").
67.

SIEGLER II, supranote 54, at 120.

68.
See Rex v. Thomas, I Keble 677 (1664) (King's Bench held that the
defendant's acquittal in Wales on a charge of murder barred a second prosecution
in England); Rex v. Hutchinson, cited in 1 Leach 135 (1677) (holding that the
defendant could not be tried in England for murder because he had already been
acquitted of the charge in Portugal); Rex v. Roche, 1 Leach 134 (1775) (noting that
if defendant had been acquitted of murder in a Dutch court it would act as a bar
to subsequent English prosecution); Rex v. Aughet, 26 Cox C.C. 232 (1918)
(respecting a foreign acquittal); United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184,
197 (1820); Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
69.
This is the dominant view followed by courts in the United States
today. See United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(citing the rule that absent a treaty, sovereign nations are not obligated to respect
or enforce the penal judgments of another sovereign). The Third Restatement on
Foreign Relations Law of the United States further supports this view, stating that
unless required by treaty, no state enforces the penal judgments of other states.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 483 cmt. 3

(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
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individual's conduct violates the laws of two sovereign nations,
that conduct may be deemed as constituting two separate and
independent offenses for the purpose of punishment. 70
Each
state, as a sovereign, may therefore seek redress for the violation
committed. 7 1 This approach, known as the doctrine of separate
sovereignties, allows each nation to consider simply whether a
violation of its own law has occurred, and to enforce its laws
regardless of whether another state has already prosecuted or
72
punished the defendant for the same crime.
From these competing viewpoints, there does not seem to be
a general consensus among nations as to the legal effect that non
bis in idem should have when considering existing foreign
judgments.7 3 For instance, some countries, such as Peru and the
Netherlands, recognize the binding force of non bis in idem and
afford foreign criminal judgments the same legal effect they do to
domestic criminal judgments. 74 Others, like Sweden, will only
apply the protection in those cases where the defendant was
previously convicted, but disregard it when the defendant was
75
previously acquitted.
As a practical matter, it is quite uncommon for a situation to
arise where more than one nation seeks to punish the same
person for the same offense because of the lack of a common code
of common international offenses. 7 6 In these rare instances when
two sovereigns choose to pursue legal action resulting from the
same conduct, the doctrine of non bis in idem arises not during
substantive criminal proceedings, but is instead most often
invoked during extradition proceedings. 7 7 Specifically, a criminal
defendant usually invokes the doctrine as a procedural tool in an
effort to avoid being extradited to face prosecution on a charge for
which he has previously been acquitted or convicted in another

70.

BASSIOUNI, supranote 57, at 598.

71.
Id. at 598-99.
72.
Id. The requesting state may seek to try the person claimed because it
believes itself to be in a better position than the other state with regard to the
evidence, and because it believes that the other state did not fully appreciate the
gravity of the offense. HarvardDraft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INTL L.
144, 145 (Supp. 1935). For further discussion see infra Part II.C.
73.

FRIEDLAND,

supra note 1,

at 359 (noting that there is

"no general

agreement amongst . . . nations as to the precise effect of a foreign criminal
judgment").
74.
Id.
75.
Id. Other variations on the doctrine focus on such factors as the
defendant's nationality and the nature of the crime. Id.
76.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 601 (recognizing the few criminal acts that
have multi-state effects which are simultaneously or concurrently pursued by
more than one state).
77.
Costa, supra note 60; see also SATYA DEVA BEDI, EXTRADITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 171-79 (1968).
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country. 78 In recognizing the validity of such a use, as well as in
an attempt to remain true to the premise underlying the
protection against double jeopardy, many sovereign nations have
addressed the problem of multiple prosecutions by adopting non
bis in idem provisions in their extradition treaties. 7 9 In recent

years, such provisions have become "common to most extradition
treaties," reflecting an expanding acceptance of this principle in
the international community.8 0
C. The Dual Sovereignty Doctrine

With respect to international double jeopardy, the United
States adheres to the view that a sovereign state is not obligated
to give legal effect to another sovereign's penal judgments.8 1
Consistent with this view, U.S. courts have held that the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the
United States from bringing criminal charges even after
prosecution by a foreign state.8 2 While this may appear to be in
direct conflict with the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
held that the principle against placing a man in double jeopardy
is offset by the more significant principle of sovereignty. 8 3 Under
this view, known as the dual sovereignty doctrine, two sovereigns,
each deriving its power from different and independent sources,
"may individually or both prosecute an offender for an infraction
84
arising from the same conduct which violates the laws of each."

Essentially, each sovereign may vindicate its own interest and
apply its own laws.
The principles underlying the dual sovereignty doctrine are
not explicitly or implicitly expressed in the federal Constitution or
in the constitution of any state, but are rather the product of
judicial construction. 85
The doctrine arose primarily to
78.

BEDI, supra note 77.

79.

6 MARJORIE WHITEMAN,

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1054 (1968)

(stating that such provisions have become common in extradition treaties).
80.
Id.
81.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 69, § 483 note 3 (Enforcement or
recognition of foreign penal judgments) (stating that the United States does not
enforce or recognize foreign penal judgments, but ironically may recognize them
for purposes of habitual criminal statutes or multiple offender sentencing laws).
82.
See United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that Guatemalan convictions did not preclude the United States from
bringing criminal charges); see also Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d
1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Malaysian convictions did not bar the
United States' prosecution of the defendant).
83.
See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
84.
Robert Matz, Dual Sovereignty and the Double Jeopardy Clause: If at
FirstYou Don't Convict, Try, Try Again, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 353, 359 (1997).
85.
Id.
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accommodate
the
demands
of concurrent
state-federal
jurisdiction in our unique system of federalism. 8 6
Under a
federalist system, governmental power is divided between two
separate and independent entities:
a central government
responsible for national affairs and local governments responsible
for local affairs. 87 The presumption which arises under such a
system asserts that each entity derives its sovereign powers from
different sources, thereby allowing for one act to equal a separate
offense against each independent sovereign. 8 8 Thus, a federal
prosecution does not preclude a subsequent state prosecution
and vice versa even though both prosecutions arise from the
89
same course of conduct.
While the foundation for the dual sovereignty doctrine can be
traced to a number of early Supreme Court cases, 90 the Court did
not actually employ the doctrine in its reasoning until United
States v. Lanza in 1922.91
In Lanza, the defendants were
prosecuted and convicted in the state of Washington for
manufacturing, transporting, and possessing liquor in violation of
the prohibition laws. 92 Subsequently, the federal government

86.
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 92 (1985); see also United States v.
Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.C. 1999).
87.
Matz, supranote 84, at 360. Federalism has been defined as:
A system of government wherein the power is divided by a constitution
between a central government and local governments . . . . Since the
United States is a federal "republic," considerations of federalism play a
major role in the interpretation of the Constitution.
BARRON's DICTIONARY OF LEGAL TERMs 181 (3d. ed. 1998).
88.
Matz, supra note 84, at 360; see also United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922).
89.
United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990). Under the
federalist system, each sovereign "has the power, inherent in any sovereign,
independently to determine what shall be an offense against its authority and to
punish such offenses. When a single act violates the laws of two sovereigns, the
wrongdoer has committed two distinct offenses." Id.
90.
See, e.g., Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847). The Court first articulated
the doctrine in Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 19-20 (1852). In Moore, the Court
stated:
An offence, in its legal signification, means the transgression of a law.
A man may be compelled to make reparation in damages to the injured
party, and be liable also to punishment for a breach of the public peace, in
consequence of the same act; and may be said, in common parlance, to be
twice punished for the same offence. Every citizen of the United States is
also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to owe allegiance to
two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the
laws of either.
Id.
91.
92.

260 U.S. 377 (1922).
Id. at 378.
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the defendants for violating the National
sought to prosecute
93
Prohibition Act.
The Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
only applied to infra-federal prosecutions, and therefore did not
bar a federal prosecution initiated after a previous state
conviction.9 4 The Court reasoned that because neither the state
government nor the federal government could "exhaust its
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other," no jurisdictional
conflict existed. 9 5 Furthermore, the Court justified the dual
sovereignty exception as a means of preventing offenders from
undermining a statute's deterrent effect by preemptively pleading
guilty in those states that imposed only nominal penalties for an
offense in an effort to secure immunity from subsequent federal
could proceed against
prosecution. 9 6 As a result, each sovereign
97
the defendants without impediment.
In 1959, the seminal cases of Bartkus v. Illinois9 8 and Abbate
v. United States9 9 recognized the dual sovereignty doctrine as a
constitutionally valid exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Bartkus, the defendant was acquitted by a federal court for
bank robbery, but was subsequently convicted and sentenced to

Id. at 379.
93.
Id. at 382. Since that time, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th
94.
Amendment has been incorporated to apply to the states through the 14th
Because the
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
Amendment.
constitutionality of the doctrine at the time seemed to be based upon the
inapplicability of the 5th Amendment on the states, Benton appeared to be the
death knell to the doctrine's validity. Matz, supranote 84, at 365-66. However, in
the post-Benton period, the court has affirmed the dual sovereignty doctrine in two
cases based on the weight of the authority established by Supreme Court
precedents-United States v. Lanza, Bartkus v. Illinois, Abbate v. United Statesand on the principles of federalism. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)
(finding that Native American tribal nations are distinct sovereigns from the
United States and that successive federal and tribal prosecutions are protected
from double jeopardy by the dual sovereignty doctrine); Heath v. Alabama, 474
U.S. 82 (1985) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive
prosecutions brought by different states).
95.
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385. The Court justifies the dual sovereignty
doctrine by stating:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different
sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same
territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to
secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity
to acts prohibited by the Amendment. Each government in determining
what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own
sovereignty, not that of the other.
Id. at 382.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 385.
Id.
359 U.S. 121 (1959).
359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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life imprisonment by an Illinois state court for the same
offense.10 0 The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding
that the dual sovereignty doctrine allows states to enforce their
01
own penal laws even after an acquittal in the federal courts. '
While the order of the prosecutions in Abbate was the reverse
of those in Bartkus, the result was, nevertheless, the same. In
that case, the Court affinmed a federal conviction that followed a
state prosecution for the same crime.' 0 2 Guiding its decision in
Abbate was the Court's concern that a case would arise where a
prosecution by one sovereign for a relatively minor offense might
bar the other from prosecuting a much graver offense.' 0 3 This, in
the opinion of the court, would effectively deprive the latter
sovereign of the right to enforce its own laws.' 0 4 Moreover, the
Court found that the application of the doctrine promoted the
efficiency
of federal
law enforcement
and noted the
impracticability of requiring "federal authorities to attempt to
keep informed of all state prosecutions which might bear on
federal offenses."' 0 5
The Court's opinion in this case is
significant because it provides several policy-based arguments
that were instrumental in not only upholding, but also extending,
10 6
the doctrine's applicability in later cases.
The Court did not, however, fully eliminate the double
jeopardy prohibition from this context. The dual sovereignty
doctrine continues to be limited by what is referred to as the
"sham" exception, which was described by the Bartkus Court.' 0 7
The sham exception provides that a prosecution by one sovereign
cannot be used as a "sham and a cover" for another sovereign's

100.
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 122.
101.
Id. at 137. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion for the majority
overlooks the significance of the early English Common Law cases that held that
an acquittal in a foreign court would bar a subsequent English prosecution. See
supra note 68. Frankfurter dismisses these cases as "dubious" because of (1) "the
confused and inadequate reporting" of Rex v. Hutchinson, and (2) "because they
reflect a power of discretion vested in English judges not relevant to the
constitutional law of our federalism.'
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 128 n.9.
One
commentator has noted that both these reasons are actually irrelevant to the
reasoning of the opinion. The opinion rests on the presumed requirements of
federalism dictating that there be an exception when two sovereignties are
involved. Walter T. Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties and the Intruding
Constitution, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 604 n.68 (1961).
102. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 188.
103. Id. at 195.
104. Id.
105.
Id.
106.
Matz, supra note 84, at 364-65. The reasoning in Abbate has served as
the foundation for the dual sovereignty doctrine's continued validity in the
jurisprudence following Benton v. Maryland. Id. at 365 n.68.
107.
Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 123-24. For further discussion see infra Part
III.C.
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re-prosecution of the same defendant.' 0 8 This doctrine would
operate to prevent, on double jeopardy grounds, a prosecution
brought by one sovereign with the encouragement and support of
another sovereign that has already failed in its attempt to
prosecute the same defendant.' 0 9 The doctrine is founded on the
1 10
rationale that the two sovereigns are acting as one.
Unfortunately, this exception has been construed so narrowly as
to make it difficult to be utilized successfully."'

III. THE VARYING APPLICATION OF NONBISINIDEM

A. No Right Without a Treaty
In the opinion of some international law scholars, the
1 12
principle of non bis in idem is so pervasive in bilateral treaties,
and
multilateral
practice,
laws,
customary
national
113
that it warrants recognition as a part of
conventions
conventional and customary international law. 1 14 It has been
written that "the principle is so obviously just, indeed, and so
widely approved in the world's legal systems, that it hardly seems

108. Id. at 124. In Bartkus, the Court rejected the defendant's argument
that the State of Illinois in prosecuting him was acting as "merely a tool of the
federal authorities, who thereby avoided the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment
against a retrial of a federal prosecution after an acquittal." Id. at 123-24. Justice
Brennan, in his dissent, argued that the Court's task was not to determine what
extent the federal government had to participate before the conviction had to be
set aside. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to him, the proper test
should be "fashioned to secure the fundamental protection of the Fifth
Amendment 'that the [Federal Government] with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." Id.
109. United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa-Soto, 938 F.2d 1015, 1018-19 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that the sham exception did not apply where the state
prosecuted the defendant at the request of the federal authorities, and federal
authorities sat at the prosecutor's table, testified as witnesses, collected evidence
for use by the state in the state prosecution, prepared witnesses for the state, and
the state attorney was appointed as a special assistant to the U.S. Attorney for the
subsequent federal prosecution).
112. See e.g., Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel, Dec. 5, 1963,
14 U.S.T. 1707; Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and
Spain, June 16, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 737; Treaty on Extradition Between the United
States of America and Australia, May 8, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 957.
For a list of some of these
113. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 358.
conventions see BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 603-05.
114. BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 605.
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necessary to adduce reasons in its support." 1 15 In the United
States, however, non bis in idem is not generally recognized as a
binding principle of either procedural or substantive law, but
rather has been confined to apply as a limited defense only in
cases of extradition. Specifically, U.S. courts will consider non bis
in idem as a bar to extradition only when a treaty is present
which prohibits the grant of extradition when the defendant
whose surrender is sought has already been tried and either
convicted or acquitted in the requested state for the offense for
which the extradition is requested." 6 Although a defendant has
little if no legal ground with which to defend himself without such
a provision, he may soon discover that even in the presence of
one, the manner in which U.S. courts define the term "offense"
has left non bis in idem provisions virtually powerless in providing
defendants with any reasonable protection from being extradited.
This assertion will be discussed more fully in the next section.
Nevertheless, from the available cases, the logical conclusion
is that non bis in idem in the United States exists as a right only
provided by treaty and applicable only in the context of
extradition. 1 17 This proposition is bolstered by the fact that U.S.
courts have held that the dual sovereignty doctrine extends to
sequential foreign and U.S. federal prosecutions, thereby leaving
defendants facing extradition without any Fifth Amendment
Double Jeopardy protection. 118 As such, it is not surprising that
the general rule followed by U.S. courts is that a sovereign nation
is not obligated to give legal effect to those criminal judgments of
another sovereign nation, and therefore no form of double
jeopardy attaches unless provided for by an extradition treaty. 11 9

115.
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (Supp. 1935).
116.
See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1980);
Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1977).
117.
Id.
118.
See, e.g., United States v. Rashed, 83 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D.C. 1999)
(holding that double jeopardy did not bar federal prosecution following Greek
It is
prosecution on related charges as Greece was a separate sovereign).
important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to address whether the
dual sovereignties exception applies in the international context.
United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998),
119.
affJd, 208 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that "a sovereign state is not
obligated to respect or enforce the criminal judgment of another sovereign state");
United States v. Richardson, 580 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that
Guatemalan charges were no bar to U.S. charges); United States v. Martin, 574
F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that "the Constitution of the United
States has not adopted the doctrine of international double jeopardy" and holding
that U.S. prosecution was not barred by the Bahamian trial).
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An excellent illustration of the application of this rule is the
recent case of United States v. Benitez.120
In Benitez, the
defendants, charged with assaulting two agents of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency in Colombia, argued that a previous
conviction by a Colombian court for the assault precluded the
United States from seeking a second prosecution for the same
offense. 12 1
The defendants relied primarily on the double
jeopardy language of Article 14(7) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).122
According to the
defendants' reading, the ICCPR bans successive international
prosecutions by different national governments for the same
violation.123 The district court disagreed with the defendants'
interpretation of the ICCPR and found that Article 14(7) barred
124
only successive internal prosecutions by the same government.
The court found that by its language, the ICCPR did not purport
to regulate affairs between nations. 125
Moreover, the court
further noted that the Humans Rights Committee established by
Article 20 of the ICCPR had held that Article 14(7) applied to
judicial decisions of a single state and not to those between
26
different states.'
In the alternative, the defendants in Benitez argued that non
bis in idem, as a principle of international law, should act as a bar

120. 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361 (S.D. Fla. 1998), affd, 208 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir.
2000).
121. The United States sought to extradite the defendants, but the
Colombian Supreme Court had annulled the extradition treaty in 1987. See
Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1363 n.2. Had there been an extradition treaty to
prohibit a successive prosecution, it would have been immaterial because the
defendants were brought to the U.S. through means other than extradition. See
id. at 1363. The Court does not comment on exactly how the defendants were
brought to the United States.
122. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1363-64. Article 14(7) of the ICCPR
provides: No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence [sic
British spelling] for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country." ICCPR (Dec. 16,
1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The United States became a party to the ICCPR on
September 8, 1992. See Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. "The intent of the
ICCPR is to provide international protection for the civil and political rights of the
individual, as well as economic, social, and cultural rights." See ICCPR, preamble,
31 I.L.M. 648.
123. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1363.
124. Id. The ICCPR is a human rights treaty prescribing how each state
should treat individuals within its own jurisdiction. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1364. The court examined the decision of the Human Rights
Committee in A.P. v. Italy, Communication No. 204/1986 (decision adopted Nov.
2, 1987 at 31st Sess.). In that case, the committee held that Italy, as a signatory
of the ICCPR, was not precluded from prosecuting an individual previously
convicted and sentenced by Switzerland for the same offense. Report of the
Human Rights Committee, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 242044, U.N. Doc. A/43.40
(1988), http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/204-1986.htm.
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Their argument focused on the
to U.S. prosecution. 12 7
proposition that non bis in idem should apply as an international
right even absent a treaty that also provided a scope of
protections broad enough to nullify the dual sovereignties
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause. 12 8 The court chose to
reject this seemingly well founded argument citing the general
rule that, absent a treaty expressing otherwise, the United States
would not be bound by the Colombian penal judgment imposed
against the defendants. 12 9 The court did, however, concede that
non bis in idem would provide broader protection only in respect
to extradition cases where a treaty expressly provided for this
protection.13 0 For the court, non bis in idem represented nothing
more than a term used to describe double jeopardy provisions in
extradition treaties.' 3 ' In characterizing the principle in this
manner, however, the court implicitly rejected the defendant's
argument that non bis in idem can stand alone as an overarching
principle of international law independent of a treaty.
The position adopted by the court in Benitez is significant
because it clearly demonstrates that American courts regard non
bis in idem as only a treaty right and not a binding principle of
international law. Only a few U.S. cases have discussed non bis
in idem at any length, and in each case, with the exception of
Benitez,'3 2 courts have examined whether a defendant could cite
a non bis in idem provision in a treaty as a defense to being
extradited to a country wishing to pursue further prosecution
against him.' 3 3 For the most part, these courts have reached the
same conclusion as the Benitez court.
It is important to note that no court has yet to expressly and
definitively state that non bis in idem is binding on the United
States as only a treaty obligation.' 3 4 One court has, however,
gone as far as to say that the "Constitution of the United States

127.
Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1364.
128. Id. at 1365.
Id.; see also Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th
129.
Cir. 1984) (holding that conviction in Malaysia does not preclude prosecution in
the United States for same offense).
130.
Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
131.
Id. at 1364.
132. In Benitez, there was no treaty. Therefore the court applied the general
rule. Id.
133.
See, e.g., Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Jurado-Rodriguez, 907 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). This situation arises
most commonly when the defendant has been "prosecuted and convicted by the
requested state and is sought by the requesting state for the identical or
substantially similar criminal conduct." BASSIOUNI, supranote 57, at 601.
134.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 607; but see Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d
234, 239 (2d Cir. 1977) which has often been cited for the proposition that non bis
in idem is a treaty right as a matter public policy.

1282

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 33:1263

has not adopted the doctrine of international double jeopardy." 135
Therefore, from the relatively short list of available opinions, it is
apparent that U.S. courts will continue to regard non bis in idem
not as an independent principle of international law, but rather
as a right supplied solely by treaty.
B.

The Same Offense

In those cases where a treaty is present, the most common
problem that U.S. courts have encountered is interpreting the
language within non bis in idem provisions describing the identity
of offenses.' 3 6 The language employed may have a significant
effect on the level of protection a defendant can expect because a
singe criminal act may give rise to more than one offense.
Specifically, the level of protection will depend on whether the
provision bars extradition for the "same offense" or for the "same
facts" for which the defendant may have already been tried,
convicted, or acquitted.13 7 Since these terms have been employed
in the international realm without qualification, determining their
meaning has indeed proven to be a difficult task.1 3 8
The
distinction between these terms is considerable and stems largely
from the differences in application between the Common Law and
Civil Law systems. 139
In Common Law countries, such as the United States,
prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in selecting which
facts and crimes to prosecute. 140 After such determinations are
made, the prosecutor "is barred from trying the same person for
substantially the same crime based on substantially the same
facts." 14 1 A narrower view, followed by U.S. courts, provides that
the double jeopardy bar on successive prosecutions for the same
offense applies only to offenses composed of the same elements of
fact and law. 14 2 Thus, if each offense contains an element not

135. United States v. Martin, 574 F.2d at 1360.
136. Harvard Research in International Law, supranote 115, at 613.
137. BASSIOUNI, supranote 57, at 600 (noting that most U.S. treaties refer to
the "same offense" or substantially the same offense, whereas some, such as the
treaty with France, use the "same facts").
138. Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 115, at 613.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Moreover, in Common Law countries, the government may not
appeal a judgment of acquittal even in situations where there may have been
errors of law and continuing questions of fact. Costa, supra note 60, at 188
(observing that the prosecutor cannot seek an appeal even where the judge made
a legal error).
142. BASSIOUNI, supra note 31, at 501.
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contained by the other, then they are not the "same offense" and
14 3
double jeopardy does not attach.
In contrast, prosecutors in Civil Systems have considerably less
discretion and are obligated to prosecute for all crimes that may
arise from the facts known to the prosecutor at the time the
defendant is charged. 144 Prosecutors are subsequently barred
from retrying all uncharged crimes that may arise out of the same
facts. 145 Unlike Common Law countries, however, prosecutors
may appeal errors of law and questions of fact under non bis in
idem.14 6 By protecting an individual for all the facts arising from
his criminal conduct, the Civil Law conceptualization of non bis in
idem essentially provides a broader scope of protection than does
the Common Law equivalent of double jeopardy. 1 4 7
With such variances in interpretations, U.S. courts have
faced some difficulty interpreting the meaning of the terms 'same
offense" and "same facts" as used in extradition treaties. 14 8 Often
times, these treaties will specify which law should be applied in
interpreting the terms, that of the requesting state or that of the
requested state. 14 9 Absent such a provision, courts will inevitably
interpret the terms of a non bis in idem provision in the context of
their own domestic understanding of the law prohibiting dual
prosecutions while simultaneously ignoring the possibility that
the other affected sovereign may hold a differing interpretation of
the same terms.' 5 0 As discussed below, this approach is also
problematic.
An analysis of the following cases will be illustrative of the
problems U.S. courts have encountered in interpreting what
constitutes the "same offense" or the "same facts" for non bis in
idem purposes.
Furthermore, these cases will further
demonstrate the differences in the level of protection provided by
each.

143.
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
144.
BASSIOUNI, supranote 57, at 600-0 1.
145.
Id. (noting same facts may include "material propositions of fact").
146.
Costa, supra note 60, at 190. In France, a Civil Law country, a party
may appeal a conviction, an acquittal, a dismissal, and or a sentence in a criminal
case. Id. Any party may appeal errors of law and questions of fact. Id.
147.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 600.
148.
Id. at 602.
149.
Id. at 600; see also BEDI, supra note 77, at 171-79.
150.
Matter of Extradition of Montiel Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 773, 777
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (observing that "American courts do . . . have considerable
experience interpreting the term 'same offense' in the context of domestic
protection against dual prosecutions").
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Sindona v. Grant (1980)

In Sindona v. Grant, the Second Circuit held that a non bis in
idem provision did not bar the defendant's extradition to face
charges in Italy where although the alleged Italian crime may
have been the "but for" cause of the U.S. offense, it was not
substantially the same offense for which the United States had
prosecuted the defendant.' 5 '
In this case, the defendant
controlled a financial group of banks with locations both in the
United States and Italy.' 5 2
In 1974, two of the banks, the
Franklin National Bank in the United States and the Banca
Privata Italiana (BPI) in Italy, collapsed causing both to file for
bankruptcy. 153
The Italian government sought the defendant's
extradition from the United States in order to face charges
relating to fraudulent bankruptcy.1 5 4 While in the United States,
however, a federal grand jury indicted the defendant on charges
similar to those claimed by Italy but relating to the collapse of the
U.S. bank.' 5 5 The issue then became whether the defendant's
U.S. indictment barred his extradition under the treaty between
15 6
the United States and Italy.
Pursuant to the language of the treaty, the court had to
determine whether Italy's extradition request was based on the
same "offense" for which the defendant had already been indicted
in the United States. S7 The court quickly realized the difficulty
in interpreting the non bis in idem provision because, although
common in extradition treaties, there was "little in the way of
reported decisions or helpful commentary with respect to their
application."Iss
For guidance in interpreting the word "offense," the court
turned to the work of one particular international law scholar, M.

151.
152.
153.

619 F.2d at 179.
Id. at 169.
Id.

154.

Id.

155.

Id.

156. Sindona, 619 F.2d at 169. Article VI(1) of the Treaty on Extradition
between the United States of America and Italy, Jan. 18, 1973, 26 U.S.T. 493
[hereinafter Treaty] bars extradition 'when the person whose surrender is sought
is being proceeded against or had been tried and discharged or punished in the
territory of the requested party for the offense for which his extradition is
requested." Id.
157.
Sindona, 619 F.2d at 177-78.
The U.S. government argued that
because some treaties provide a broader protection by using the term "acts" rather

than "offense," the fact that this treaty uses "offense" is significant. Id.
158. Id. From the sparse commentary available, the court did conclude that
such treaty restrictions derive form the norm of non bis in idemt. Id.
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Cherif Bassiouni. I5 9 According to Bassiouni, the terms "same
offense" and "same conduct" are subject to broad interpretive
leeway. 160 The "same conduct" may range from "identical acts" to
"multiple acts committed in more than one place and at different
times but related to the actor's initial design."' 6 1 Similarly, the
term "same offense" ranges from "identical charges" to related but
not included offenses. 16 2
With such interpretive variances,
Bassiouni asserts that the scope of any non bis in idem provision
will depend in large measure on the interpretations given these
terms that are borrowed from the domestic law and policies of the
3
contracting parties.16
The U.S. Government, relying on both Bassiouni's position
and Article X 1 64 of the Treaty, argued that the word "offense"
should be interpreted in the context of U.S. law.165 As such, the
Government asserted that the proper test to be applied to
determine whether a charge constitutes the same offense for
double jeopardy purposes was the Supreme Court's Blockburger
test, sometimes referred to as the "same elements" test. 16 6 The

159.
Id. M. Cherif Bassiouni is a professor of law at Depaul University in
Chicago. He studied law at Dijon University in France and attended the graduate
program in international law at the University of Geneva, Switzerland. In the
United States, Prof. Bassiouni earned a J.D from Indiana University and a J.S.D.
from George Washington University. He is considered a world-renowned scholar
of international law and has served as the president of the International Institute
of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences at Siracusa, Italy. BASSIOUNI, supra note
57.
160. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 455-56 (1974).
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id. at 459; see also FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 391 (predicting that an
English judge would apply English double jeopardy law to a treaty provision if
asked to extradite a defendant who had already been tried in England by another
state seeking to prosecute the defendant for an offense based on the same
transaction); see also Matter of Extradition of Montiel Garcia, 802 F. Supp. at 773,
777.
164. Article X specifies that "[t]he determination that extradition should or
should not be granted shall be made in accordance with the law of the requested
Party." Treaty, supranote 156.
165.
Sindona, 619 F.2d at 177-78.
166.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). According to the
Supreme Court in Blockburger, "the test to be applied to determine whether there
are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not." Id. at 304. The Blockburger test was
the predominant test applied by the Court until 1990 when the Court decided
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990). The Grady test bars a subsequent
prosecution in which the government, in order to establish an essential element of
an offense charged in that prosecution, had to prove conduct that constituted an
offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. Id. at 521. In 1993,
Grady was overturned and the narrowly defined Blockburgertest was reinstated in
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 703-712 (1993). In Dixon, the court
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court, however, rejected this position. 16 7 The court commented
that under the Blockburger test, the non bis in idem provision

would be inapplicable since the offense charged in Italy required
proof of many facts and elements not charged in the United
States and vice versa. 168 The court perceptively recognized that
similar offenses may be defined differently by different countries,
and therefore it would be impractical to apply the U.S.
Blockburger test to foreign law. 169 In light of this observation, the
court noted that "a court should not deem itself bound by a
l 0
quiddity of the law of the requested party." '
In the court's view, the only way to not render the provision
completely impotent would be to adopt a test similar to the one
delineated by the district court, namely "a modified and more
flexible test of whether the same conduct or transaction underlies
the criminal charges in both transactions." 17 1 The court also
identified the Department of Justice's Petite Policy as being a
more appropriate standard in these cases. 1 72 The Petite Policy
provides protection from a subsequent federal prosecution for the
"same act" or "acts" except when there are "compelling federal
interests for such a prosecution." 173 In the court's view, if the
defendant's rights are not to be violated, the meaning attached to
the word "offense" should provide a level of protection broader
than that provided under the Blockburger test. 17 4
Even under the broadest reading of the non bis in idem
provision, however, the court held that the defendant's U.S.
indictment did not bar his extradition to Italy. 17 s According to
the court, the Italian charges against the defendant encompassed

observed that the "'same elements' test inquires whether each offense contains an
element not contained in the other, if not, they are the 'same offense." Id. at 696.
167. Sindona, 619 F.2d at 178.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 178.
171. Id. The court recognizes the similarity between the test proposed by
the district court and Justice Brennan's concurrence in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (concurring opinion) that "the Double Jeopardy Clause
requires the prosecution, except in most limited circumstances, to join at one time
all the charges against a defendant which grow out of a single act, occurrence,
episode or transaction." Id.
172. Id. In 1959, the Department of Justice instituted the Petite policy that
allows federal reprosecutions only when there are compelling reasons and when
the Assistant Attorney General gives his approval. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS'
MANUAL § 9-2.142. The policy states in part: "No Federal case should be tried
when there has been a state prosecution for substantially the same act or acts
without a recommendation having been made to the Assistant Attorney General
demonstrating compelling Federal interests for such prosecution." Id.
173. Id.
174. Sindona, 619 F.2d at 177-78.
175.

Id. at 179.
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a gigantic fraud on Italian banks.' 7 6 Italy's concern was the
harm done to Italian depositors in the collapse of BPI while the
United States was focused on the harm to U.S. depositors and
investors affected by the collapse of the Franklin National
Bank. 17 7 The crimes charged in the U.S. indictment were, in the
court's opinion, on the "periphery" of those sought by the Italian
government. 17 8 The court observed that while the Italian fraud
may have been the "but for" cause of the Franklin Bank collapse,
it was not substantially the same offense for which the defendant
was indicted in the United States. 17 9 As such, the defendant
could be extradited to face charges in Italy.' 8 0
2. United States v. Jurado-Rodriguez (1995)
In United States v. Jurado-Rodriguez,18 1 a U.S. district court
examined the scope of protection provided by the non bis in idem
1 82
provision of the United States-Luxembourg Extradition Treaty.
The court held that an indictment for crimes that are
substantively different and have a sufficiently separate
evidentiary base did not violate even the express limiting language
3
of non bis in idem prohibitions in an extradition decree.'1
In this case, the defendants were convicted and sentenced to
jail in Luxembourg for having designed and carried out a money
laundering operation involving $36 million stemming from
cocaine trafficking. 184 In 1992, pursuant to the United StatesLuxembourg Extradition Treaty, the United States sought the
defendants' extradition to face charges of conspiracy to engage in

176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.

179.
Id. In its holding, the court reasoned that the non bis in idem provision
could not have been intended to have substantial elements of the crime left
unpunished. Id
180.
Id.
181.
907 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
182.
Article III of the treaty reads:
A person surrendered under this convention shall not be tried or punished
in the country to which his extradition has been granted, nor given up to a
third power for a crime or offence not provided for by the present
convention and committed previously to his extradition ....
United States-Luxembourg Extradition Treaty, Oct 29, 1883, art. III U.S.-Lux., 23
Stat. 808, amended April 24, 1935, U.S.-Lux., 49 Stat. 3355.
183.
See Jurado-Rodriguez,907 F. Supp. at 580-81.
184.
Id. at 571-72. Defendant Jurado was sentenced to fifty-four months in
prison and fined five million Luxembourg francs (approx. $165,000); Defendant
Garcia was sentenced to five years in prison and fined ten million Luxembourg
francs (approx. $333,000). Id.
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narcotics distribution and money laundering,1 8s and in May
18 6
1994, Luxembourg granted the extradition request.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that a U.S.
prosecution would violate the express terms of the extradition
decree in that it would constitute a second prosecution for the
offense for which they had been previously tried, convicted, and
sentenced in Luxembourg.1 8 7 The extradition decree, which was
issued at the time Luxembourg granted the U.S. extradition
request, explicitly set out a limitation that the defendants "cannot
be prosecuted or judged in the United States of America due to
the Taits' making up the subject of the extradition request for
which [they] were prosecuted and judged in the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg." 8 8
The court, realizing it needed help in
interpreting the treaty and the decree, enlisted the help of two
international experts who testified as to Luxembourg law, non bis
in ider, and the extent to which evidence used in the original trial
may be used in a subsequent U.S. trial.189
In its discussion, the court acknowledged that because
Luxembourg was the surrendering state, it had to interpret the
specific protection contained in the extradition decree according
to the laws of Luxembourg. 190 In doing so, the question then
became: what meaning should be given to the term 'falts' for
double jeopardy purposes?' 9 ' The court determined that Taits' as
intended by the extradition decree referred to what U.S. courts
recognize as "material propositions of fact." After making this
determination, the court was careful to distinguish between
conduct as it relates to the elements of an offense and evidence as
it relates to the proofs of the offense before applying its meaning

185. Id. at 573. The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) took an
active role in helping to apprehend the defendants by providing the Luxembourg
police with equipment to install wiretaps. Id. at 571-72.
186. Id. The Luxembourg extradition decree contained both charges
asserted in the U.S. extradition request. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 574-75. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, which
allows a court to consider testimony explaining foreign law, the court heard
testimony from Professor Christopher Blakesley, professor of law at Columbia, and
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, professor of law at Depaul University.
190. Id. at 577-78. The court found that Luxembourg follows French civil
law jurisprudence, which holds that the doctrine of non bis in idem incorporates
related acts and the use of evidence supporting such similar acts. Id. The court
observed that the that the civil law's formulation of non bis in idcem conferred a
broader protection for defendants than did the double jeopardy provision of the
Constitution of the United States. Id.
191.
Id. at 578. Faits could be either 'facts' or 'acts.' Either way, the court
maintained that its definition was not dispositive in determining whether all the
evidence admitted in the Luxembourg trial should be excluded. Id.
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of Taits' to the facts. 19 2 Applying its analysis, the court dismissed
the money laundering charge noting the broad scope of non bis in
idem, and that on this count, the U.S. government was relying on
primarily the same faits' as had been relied upon in the
Luxembourg trial: "that is to say on almost the identical material
193
propositions of fact."
The basis of the court's holding on the money laundering
charge depended on the fact that the material elements of the
charge were substantially the same. 19 4 The court, therefore,
focused on the substantial similarity of the conduct, not on the
evidence to be presented in the U.S. case. 1 9s Relying on this
analysis, the court upheld the charge of drug trafficking as a
sufficiently separate offense. 196 The defendants' prior conviction
in Luxembourg was for laundering the proceeds stemming from
the sale of narcotics. 197 The material propositions of fact on
which the U.S. charge was predicated focused more on the drug
trafficking itself and were therefore substantially different than
those of the money laundering charge. 198
The court further
reasoned that even though some of the evidence used to prove
this charge was the same as that used in the Luxembourg trial,
the conspiracy to engage in drug trafficking is distinctly different
from that of money laundering. 1 99
The court's holding is
therefore significant: where the material propositions of fact are
substantially different, even though some evidence may be similar
to that used in prior prosecution, neither non bis in idem, nor
double jeopardy bars prosecution.
3. Elcock v. United States (2000)
In the most recent non bis in idem case, Elcock v. United
States, Judge Trager encountered many of the same problems
interpreting the double jeopardy provision of the extradition
treaty between the United States and Germany as did Judge
Friendly in Sindona.2 00 In this case, the German government
sought the extradition of the defendant in order to face larceny

192.
Jurado-Rodriguez,907 F. Supp. at 578. The court recognizes that a
rule that would exclude evidence used in prior case would be unworkable. Id.
193.
Id. at 580. The government relied on evidence similar, if not identical,
to that relied upon in the Luxembourg trial on the money laundering charge. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 580-81.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200.
80 F. Supp. 2d 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).

1290

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 33:1263

charges arising from a bank robbery committed in Berlin. 20 1 In
the United States, the defendant was charged with transporting
currency stolen from the Berlin Bank in foreign commerce and
smuggling currency into the United States. 20 2 In an attempt to
block his extradition, the defendant argued that because of his
U.S. prosecution, the non bis in idem provision of the treaty
Germany
barred
his
between
the
United
States
and
extradition. 20 3
The primary issue before the court centered
around what meaning to attach to the term "offense" for the
20 4
purpose of applying the treaty.
In this case, Judge Trager, relying primarily on Judge
Friendly's recommendations in Sindona, made a significant
attempt to articulate a workable standard for applying the
principles of double jeopardy in the context of extradition in a
manner that effectuated the intent of the parties involved. 20 5 In
this attempt, the court focused primarily on the language of the
treaty warning that domestic law should serve as a "second-best
solution to the difficult problem of applying a transnational legal
concept whose precise meaning is not fixed by international
law."20 6 Even though the court was hesitant to apply domestic
law, it nevertheless engaged in a comparison of the parties' views
of double jeopardy in an attempt to ascertain how each intended
20 7
to interpret the term offense.
On the one hand, the U.S. government argued that the term
aoffense" should be interpreted using the Blockburger or the
"same elements" test, an argument that was consistent with the

201. Id. at 73. The defendant was suspected of assisting his girlfriend, an
employee of the bank, in stealing $419,720 in various national currencies. Id.
202. Id. at 73. After having committed the robbery, the defendant mailed
the currency to his sister in the United States. Shortly thereafter, he flew to the
United States in order to receive the package. Id. During a routine x-ray of the
package, the U.S. Customs Service detected the currency and set up a sting
operation to capture the recipient of the package. Id. After the package was
delivered and accepted by the defendant, he was arrested. Id.
203. Id. at 75. Primarily, the defendant relied on Article 8 of the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany
Concerning Extradition, June 20, 1978, art. 8, U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 1485, which
provides:
Extradition shall not be granted when the person whose extradition is
requested has been tried and discharged or punished with final and
binding effect by the competent authorities of the Requested State for the
offense for which his extradition is requested.
Id.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 80-81.
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On the other

hand, the court observed that Germany, as a Civil System, placed
a broader interpretation on the principle of non bis in idern than
did the United States on double jeopardy.2 0 9 According to the
court, German law, in contrast with U.S. law, prohibits multiple
prosecutions not for the same offense, but rather for the broader
same act or "tat."2 10 As such, in making a non bis in idem
determination, a German court would focus on the facts of the
underlying prosecution, rather than on the elements of the
offense committed. 2 11 The defendant would then be protected
from re-prosecution for all offenses arising from the robbery itself
because this view provides a broader level of protection.
From the evidence presented, the court keenly observed the
possibility that the United States and Germany lacked a "shared
understanding" of the meaning of the term "offense" when they
executed the Treaty. 2 12 The court went on to note that under
traditional contracts law, a court could find that, because each
country ascribed a different meaning to the term, there was no
meeting of the minds and therefore no contract had been
formed. 2 13 Moreover, the court noted that because commentators
had recognized the varying interpretations of non bis in idern,
both the United States and Germany should have had
"constructive knowledge" that the principle was interpreted

2 14
differently in their respective legal systems.
In the end, however, the court's attempt to apply a practical
international standard that was not based solely on domestic law
was futile. With no international consensus on the interpretation
of "offense" and differing views by the parties' themselves, the
court recognized that it was in no position to void a treaty
properly signed by the President and ratified by the Senate even
though the parties lacked a shared understanding of the treaty's

208. Id. at 80. The Department of State has long held the position that the
term "offense" encompasses only crimes whose elements are identical and crimes
that constitute lesser included offenses. Id.
209. Id. at 81. In order to gain a better understanding of German law, the
court sought the help of Professor Markus Dubber of the State University of New
York at Buffalo, author of several comparative law articles, with an emphasis on
German law. Id.
210. Id. A "tat" according to Professor Dubber is a "historical occurrence
that, according to general life experience, counts as a single act." Id.
211. Id. The court also observed that "the Civilist concept of non his in idem
is not only broader than double jeopardy, but it is also based on the prohibition of
prosecution for the same facts, and not only for the same or substantially the
same crimes arising out of the same facts." Id. (quoting BASSIOUNI, supra note 57,
at 600-01).
212. Id. at 82.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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provisions.2 15 As such, the court was left with no alternative but
to defer to the Executive Branch's interpretations of the term2 in
16
like provisions of other treaties and apply the Blockburgertest.
In applying the Blockburger test to the facts, the court held that
because the elements of the offense for which the defendant was
prosecuted in the United States were not identical to those for
him, the non bis in idem
which Germany sought to prosecute
2 17
provision did not bar his extradition.
C.

The Sham Exception-United States v. Rashed

In another recent case, United States v. Rashed, a federal
court for the first time examined the applicability of the sham
2 18
In
exception discussed in Bartkus in the international context.
Rashed, the defendant claimed that a prior Greek prosecution for

the

same

charges. 2 19

crime

barred

the

U.S.

trial

on

aircraft

bombing

In challenging the dual sovereignty doctrine, the

defendant claimed that the sham exception applied and that the
United States dominated and directed the Greek proceedings so
22 0
completely that double jeopardy attached.

The defendant wisely did not attack what the court described
as the "uncontrovertible": that the United States and Greece were

separate sovereigns. 22 1
because

the United

The defendant argued, however, that

States provided

assistance

in

the

Greek

prosecution, the two countries proceeded as one rather than two

separate and independent sovereigns. 222

In addressing this

argument, the court noted that because the exception is
substantial burden on
extremely narrow, it imposes a
22 3
In order for the defendant to satisfy his burden,
defendants.

Id. at 83.
215.
Id.
216.
217.
Id. at 84-85.
83 F.Supp. 2d 96, 101 (D.C. 1999).
218.
Id. at 97. In this case, the defendant had served eight years in a Greek
219.
prison following his prosecution. Id. at 100. Shortly after his release, he was
taken into custody by the FBI and taken to the U.S. for further prosecution. Id.
220.
Id.
Id. at 101.
221.
Id. at 102. In the process of investigating the charges against Rashed,
222.
the Greek Government not only requested U.S. assistance but also made an
evidence-gathering visit to the United States. Id. at 98-99. The United States also
provided both FBI agents to testify at the trial as well as prosecutors to provide
further assistance during the prosecution. Id.
Id. at 101. The court lists those cases that have either described the
223.
exception as being narrow or that have questioned whether such an exception
truly exists. Id. at 10 1-02.
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the court required that he be able to show that the Greek officials
2 24
"had little or no independent volition in the state proceedings."
In the international context, the court further required that
the defendant not only meet the "little or no independent volition"
test, but that he show that the United States used the Greek
prosecution to achieve an objective they could not otherwise
achieve under the Constitution. 2 2 5 The court found that the
defendant did not meet either requirement holding that Greece
acted independent and contrary to the United States' express
wishes. 2 2 6 Moreover, the court noted that the United States
gained nothing from the Greek prosecution except a delay of its
own opportunity to prosecute the defendant. 2 2 7 The fact that the
United States cooperated with the Greek government did not
22 8
merit a finding that the sham exception applied.

IV.

THE UNITED STATES SHOULD ABANDON THE DUAL SOVEREIGNTY
DOCTRINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL REALM

Although the dual sovereignty doctrine is well established as
229
principle, it is the source of great criticism.
constitutional
a
Commentators have almost uniformly attacked the doctrine's
validity and have advocated for its elimination as it is applied in
U.S. domestic law. 23 0 One of its primary criticisms is that it

224.
Id. at 102 (quoting United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 79 (D.C. Cir.
1979)).
225.
Id.
226.
Id. The United States initially had requested that Rashed be extradited
to the U.S. Id. at 98. Greece had agreed to do so, but later decided to prosecute
him in Greece. Id.
227.
Id. at 102.
228.
Id. In reality, the U.S. cooperation was based on a treaty obligation.
Id. As a signatory of the Montreal Convention, the U.S. was required to provide
"the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal proceedings
brought in respect of the offences." Id. The court further noted that cooperation
between separate sovereigns does not amount to a facially valid double jeopardy
claim. Id.; see also United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Auto. Group, 66 F.3d 483,
494 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that "we have repeatedly held that even significant
cooperation ... does not provide a basis for applying the Bartkus exception').
229.
The following is a list of law review articles criticizing the Supreme
Court's construction of the dual sovereignty doctrine: Matz, supra note 84, at
359; Eric J. McDonald Guadalupe, Double Jeopardy, Dual Sovereignty and Other
Legal Fictions, 28 REv. JUR. U.I.P.R. 201 (1994); Susan Herman, Double Jeopardy
All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV.
609, 625 (1994); Kevin J. Hellmann, The Fallacy of Dueling Sovereignties: Why the
Supreme Court Refuses to Eliminate the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 2 J.L. & POL'Y
149 (1994); Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule Permitting
Successive Prosecutionsin the Age of Cooperative Federalism,20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1
(1992); Allen & Ratnaswamy, supranote 17, at 801.
230. Id.
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provides prosecutors a second chance to prosecute acquitted
defendants, and thus virtually guarantees a conviction on the
second try.2 3 l Given a second bite of the apple, prosecutors may
benefit from hindsight concerning prior mistakes. With a second
chance, prosecutors can ensure a conviction by interviewing
jurors, collecting further evidence, and selecting a more favorable
23 2
jury for the second trial.
Under such a system, the injustice is even greater for
defendants, such as the ones in Rashed and Elcock, who had
been previously convicted and had already served time in prison
when sought for a second prosecution. 23 3 In securing a second
conviction for the same offense, prosecutors have the advantage
that the defendants have already been found guilty with the
evidence available. In effect, a re-prosecution of a defendant after
his release subjects him to another trial and perhaps a second
punishment.
Despite the injustices suffered by defendants, the Court4
23
continues to uphold and expand the doctrine's applicability.
In response, however, approximately half the state legislatures
and the Department of Justice have taken measures to limit, if
not prevent, successive prosecutions. Several state legislatures
have passed statutes barring state prosecutions in cases where
defendants have previously been tried by an independent
prosecuting authority such as the federal government or another
Similarly, the Department of Justice
state government. 23 5
instituted the Petite Policy which reflects the Department's intent
to voluntarily abstain from bringing a federal action following a
state prosecution unless compelling federal interests are
23 6
present.
On the international level, these safeguards have little if no
effect. State statutes and the DOJ's internal policy provide no
defense or protection for a defendant being prosecuted by the

231. See Matz, supranote 84, at 372.
232. Id.
233. In Rashed the defendant served 8 years in prison. 83 F.Supp. 2d at
100. The defendant in Elcock served thirty months in prison. 80 F.Supp. 2d at
74.
234. See e.g., Lanza, 260 U.S. at 377.
235. See, e.g., Ala. Code. § 12.20.010 (1984); Cal. Penal Code § 656 (West
1988); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-1-8 (Michie 1992); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 3-4
(Smith-Hurd 1989); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21- 31083(3) (1988); Miss. Code Ann. § 9911-27 (1972); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-404 (1990). For a complete list of statutes
see Braun, supranote 229, at 5 n. 15.
236. See supra note 168; see also Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529
(1960) (announcing the government's general policy that several offenses arising
out of a single transaction should be alleged and tried together rather than being
the basis of multiple prosecutions).
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U.S. government in a federal court. 23 7 At best, they serve as
evidence of the widespread contempt for the goals underlying the
doctrine. At the present time, a defendant's only hope of avoiding
being subjected to a second prosecution in the United States or
being extradited to a country wishing to pursue further
prosecution is either an extradition treaty expressly prohibiting
such occurrences or the hope that U.S. courts abolish the dual
sovereignty doctrine and recognize non bis in idem as having the
legal effect of prohibiting a second prosecution. The interpretive
problems associated with defining treaty provisions and the
improbability that the Supreme Court will abolish the doctrine
means that defendants are often left vulnerable to multiple
prosecutions.
The following sections examine several arguments that
undermine the doctrine's validity and reasons why U.S. courts
should abandon the dual sovereignty doctrine in the international
context, replacing it with a broader, more practical standard.
A. As Applied in the InternationalContext, the Dual
Sovereignty DoctrineLacks Basis in U.S.
Historicaland InternationalPractice
Quite noticeably, any discussion describing the historical
foundation for the doctrine is missing from all the Supreme Court
cases championing dual sovereignty. 23 8
For instance, Justice
Taft's opinion in United States v. Lanza has served as a clear and
often cited precedent for later cases affirming the doctrine, but
the opinion itself provides little reasoning or support for the
holding. 23 9
Without maling any reference to the interests
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause or the framer's intent,
Justice Taft simply announced that dual prosecutions were not
precluded between two different sovereigns, even though on its
24°
face, the Fifth Amendment provides for no such exception.
Had the Court ever engaged in an examination of history, it
would have discovered that the framers of the Double Jeopardy
Clause probably would not have accepted the dual sovereignty

237. The Petite Policy's scope and effectiveness is actually subject to three
limitations: "(1) since the petite policy is an internal administrative policy it is not
subject to judicial review, (2) the Department's guidelines on applying the policy
are vague, and (3) defendants cannot use the policy as a defense to successive
prosecutions." Ophelia Camina, Selective Preemption: A Preferential Solution to
the Bartkus-Abbate rule in Successive Federal-StateProsecutions,"57 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 340, 348 (1981).
238.
See Herman, supranote 229, at 625.
239.
Id. at 622-23.
240.
Id.
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doctrine as it exists today. 24 1 While the Double Jeopardy Clause
was adopted with little debate as to its meaning, the framers
intended the Clause to conform to the "universal practice in Great
Britain." 24 2 At the time of the Clause's adoption, the English
common law position was clear on this point. Several English
cases, all predating the adoption of the Constitution, have been
relied on as establishing the rule that a person tried by a foreign
court having competent jurisdiction may not be tried for the same
offense in an English court. 2 43 Furthermore, it is logical to
conclude that if the framers of Constitution had intended to allow
for multiple prosecutions by separate sovereigns, they would have
specified or provided an exception similar to the dual sovereignty
doctrine.
Moreover, in the time period following the adoption of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the United States' international practice
with respect to successive international prosecutions appears to
be consistent with the English common law view.2 44 Two early
Supreme Court cases are significant in supporting this
proposition. In United State v. Furlong,the Court recognized that
for certain crimes, such as piracy, which fall within the criminal
jurisdiction of all nations, "there can be no doubt that the plea of
autre fois acquit would be good in any civilized state, though
resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any civilized
state."245 In Rose v. Himley, the Court rejected any effort to retry,
24 6
collaterally, criminal issues determined in a foreign court.
Chief Justice Marshall plainly stated that "if the port of St.
Domingo had jurisdiction of the case, its sentence is
24 7
conclusive."
More recently, the United States, by signing the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA), agreed to recognize the criminal
judgments of other signatory states. 2 48 Part of the agreement
provides for a situation where two or more sovereigns share
concurrent criminal jurisdiction over military personnel stationed

241.
242.
243.

Id.

supranote 54, at 32.
See supra note 68; see also SIEGLER I1, supra note 54, at 127;
FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 360-36 1; 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN, ch. 35, § 10 (Thomas Leach ed., 6th ed. 1787) (stating "I take it to
be settled this day, that an acquittal in any court whatsoever which has a
jurisdiction of the cause, is a good bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same
crime, as an acquittal in the highest court').
244.
See Thomas Franck, An InternationalLawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule,
34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1096, 1099 (1959).
245.
18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820).
246.
8 U.S. 241 (1808).
247.
See id. at 276.
248.
See N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T.
1792.
SIEGLER II,
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abroad. 24 9 In fact, the agreement provides a double jeopardy
clause that requires the sending state and the receiving state to
respect criminal judgments of the other as fmal except as it
regards breaches of military discipline.2 5 0 While problems may
still arise under this article, the intent is clear: "the exercise of
jurisdiction by one party, either because it has primary
jurisdiction or because the other party has waived its right to
primary jurisdiction, bars a subsequent prosecution by the
251
other."
From this evidence, one could logically argue that on the
international level, the dual sovereignty doctrine lacks any
substantive foundation. The truth of the matter is that both U.S.
history and international practice support the view that the
United States, at least implicitly, recognized non his in idem as a
bar to multiple prosecutions in the international realm, and it
should continue to do so today.
B. The Same Conduct Test
While the dual sovereignty doctrine rests on a shaky
foundation, it will most likely continue to be upheld by U.S.
courts. If so, non bis in idem continues to operate only as a treaty
right subject to the interpretative pitfalls arising from the term
"same offense," and in some cases "same facts." In order to avoid
such problems, courts should not continue to rely on the
Blockburger test as the measure of what constitutes the "same
offense." To apply such a test would render such provisions
impotent to protect a defendant's right not to be placed in
jeopardy twice for the same offense.

249. See Franck, supra note 244, at 1099. The United State has signed
several SOFAs with Germany and countries that host U.S. troops for long periods
of time. See, e.g., Daniel Pagano, Criminal Jurisdictionof United States Forces in
Europe, 4 PACE Y.B. INTLL. 189 (1992).
250. Article VII, § 5 of the Agreement provides:
Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of
this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been
acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence
or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offence
within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party.
However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of
the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of
rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an
offence for which he was tried by the authorities of another Contracting
Party.
N.A.T.O. Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792.
251. FRIEDLAND, supra note 1, at 398. The ultimate interpretation of the
double jeopardy clause in this agreement will most likely rest in the courts of the
signatory nations. Id.
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If Blockburger's "same elements" test remains the dominant
standard applied, defendants could only benefit from an
extradition treaty if they are able to prove that the elements of an
offense prosecuted by a foreign court paralleled exactly those
being pursued by a U.S court. The fact of the matter is that it
would be impossible to find a foreign offense that required exactly
the same elements as would its U.S. equivalent. 2 S2 A foreign
offense, at the very least, would logically differ in the elements
required, the defense opened to the accused, the burden of proof,
and generally the criminal process involved.2 5 3
In essence,
continued reliance on Blockburger would in no uncertain terms
eliminate the defense of non bis in idem entirely in extradition
cases.
It is at least inferable that the United States is attempting to
provide defendants some level of protection from successive
prosecutions on the international level, especially since non bis in
idem provisions have become commonplace in U.S. treaties. If
this is the case, it would be nonsensical for courts to weaken
such provisions by construing them so narrowly as to provide a
defendant no protection at all. In order to effectuate the purpose
of providing for non bis in idem safeguards, courts should adopt
an approach similar to the one taken by the Sindona court.
In Sindona, Judge Friendly recognized the problems
associated with the use of the domestic law standard under
Blockburger, and proposed the adoption of a more flexible test to
be applied in the international law context that would protect
defendants from being extradited for the same conduct or
transaction
underlying
the
criminal
charges
in
both
sovereigns. 2 S 4
Judge Friendly identified Justice Brennan's
position in Ashe v. Swenson and the Petite Policy as examples of
25 5
possible tests to be applied in the extradition context.
Irrespective of which one is adopted, both provide a broader level
of protection because of their focus on the defendant's conduct,
not the elements of the crime. A modified version of the Petite
Policy may actually represent a better standard in that it provides
an avenue for a sovereign to proceed with a second prosecution
when it has significant interests at stake that were not met by the
first prosecution. Nevertheless, under either, it is immaterial

252. Id. at 383 (making this observation but in the context of English law).
253. Id.
254.
See Sindona, 619 F.2d at 178. In United States v. Rashed, the
defendants argued that in the international context, a conduct based test should
apply because similar offenses may be defined differently in various countries.
1999 WL 1320187 *7 (D.C. 1999). The court, however, rejected this proposal and
applied the Blockburgersame elements test. Id.
255.
See supranotes 168, 243.
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what name an offense is identified by so long as the conduct is
substantially the same.
Therefore, while certain acts may
constitute embezzlement in State X, larceny under the laws of
State Y, and statutory theft in State Z, the defendant is protected
from multiple prosecutions because the conduct at issue is
2 56
substantially the same.
By adopting a conduct based test, courts will better preserve
not only the goals of providing non bis in idem provisions, but also
a defendant's right not to be prosecuted twice for the same crime.
C. Joint Prosecutions
Several commentators have further criticized the dual
sovereignty doctrine as being based on an antiquated view of
federalism. 25 7 It is the Court's belief that without the dual
sovereignty doctrine, federal and state prosecutors would compete
for the exclusive right to prosecute defendants that have, through
a single criminal act, violated the laws of both sovereigns. 2 s8 In
reality, federal and state prosecutors and law enforcement
agencies have become increasingly cooperative with one another
as a result of the fact that both state and federal laws prohibit
much of the same behavior. 25 9 In this age of "cooperative
federalism," cooperation is commonplace among prosecutors
because their interests in prosecuting criminal acts frequently
2 60
coincide.
This spirit of cooperation has spread to the point where the
activities of state and federal law enforcement agencies are so
intertwined that they cannot be considered separate and
independent agencies. 2 6 1 With advances in telecommunication
technology and computer applications, cooperation and

256.
See Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 115, at 614.
257.
See Matz, supra note 84, at 374; see also Hellmann, supranote 229, at
162.
258.
See Matz, supra note 84, at 374
259.
See Hellmann, supra note 229, at 165. While crime has traditionally
been viewed as a local issue, Congress began federalizing certain kinds of crimes
starting with a mail fraud statute passed in 1872. See Braun, supra note 229, at
4. This gradual convergence of federal and state jurisdictions has blurred the line
dividing the state and federal prosecutorial authority that has served as the basis
of traditional federalism to the point where each is undistinguishable from the
other. Id. at 70-72.
260.
"Cooperative federalism" is a term used by the Supreme Court to
describe the united front waged by federal and state governments against several
types of criminal activities. See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 56 (1964). At least one commentator has expressed his
concern that this type of cooperative federalism will eventually give rise to
collusion between federal and state prosecutors against criminal defendants. See
Braun, supra note 229, at 70-72.
261.
See Matz, supranote 84, at 373.
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coordination among law enforcement agencies has never been
more feasible and desirable.2 62 As cooperation increases between
federal and state governments, the premise on which the dual
sovereignty doctrine rests becomes weaker. This is so because
sovereigns will no longer be working as separate, independent
entities, but rather as single units driven by the common goal of
prosecuting defendants.
Similarly, there has also been international movement
towards a greater level of international cooperation among
2 63
national police forces and criminal investigation organizations.
Today, modern crime transcends international borders.
The
United States, as arguably the sole world superpower, is actively
involved in trying to curb crimes such as drug trafficking, money
laundering, and terrorism on an international level. 2 64 As such,
the United States has joined other countries in a collaborative
effort extending to "information and evidence gathering,
intelligence work, permission to conduct investigations in the
respective national ferritories, and apprehension of criminals
2 65
within foreign territories."
Whether in the domestic or international realm, this
increased level of cooperation will give rise to a greater level of
2 66
collusion between sovereigns against criminal defendants.
This continued level of cooperation, however, is in direct conflict
with the fundamental principles underlying the dual sovereignty
doctrine. In order for the doctrine to retain any credibility as a
Constitutional principle, the different sovereigns must maintain a

262. Id.
263. See Jacqueline Klosek, The Development of International Police
Cooperation Within the EU and Between the EU and Third Party States: A
Discussion of the Legal Bases of Such Cooperation and the Problems and Promises
Resulting Thereof, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 599, 656 (1999) (discussing the increase
in international cooperation in criminal investigations); see also Abraham
Abramovsky & Jonathan Edelstein, The Sheinbein Case and the Israeli-American
Extradition Experience: A Need to Compromise, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305
(1999) (discussing cooperation between the United States and Israel in law
enforcement); Barrett Atwood and Molly McConville, Money Laundering, 36 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 901 (1999) (examining the increased international cooperation in
preventing money laundering); Jimmy Gurule, The 1988 U.N. Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances-A Ten Year
Perspective: Is InternationalCooperationMerely llusory?, 22 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 74
(1998) (examining the increased cooperation in preventing drug trafficking).
264. Money laundering is a major concern because of its devastating social
consequences. It provides an avenue for drug dealers and terrorists as well as
other criminals to operate and expand their criminal networks. See Gurule, supra
note 263, at 76-77. Furthermore, the United States is a party to several multilateral and bilateral treaties intended to foster international cooperation in
narcotics enforcement, the most important being the U.N. Convention against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Id. at 77-78.
265. Klosek, supranote 263, at 602.
266. See Braun, supranote 229.
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certain level of independence and separateness from one another
in vindicating their own respective interests. Each must only
seek to vindicate and pursue its own interests. As the world
becomes increasingly smaller, however, countries will continue to
work together to accomplish common interests. This means that
defendants will be faced with defending themselves not against
one government's
resources
and power,
but multiple
governments' resources and power working in conjunction.
One way to avoid inflicting a greater injustice upon
defendants is for U.S. courts to adopt a broader version of the
sham exception. The defendant in Rashed unsuccessfully argued
that because the United States provided a high level of assistance
to Greece during his trial, the sham exception should have barred
his prosecution in the United States. 26 7 The court's rejection of
this argument and acceptance of the "little or no independent
volition test" signals that the sham exception, as it is understood
today, is entirely too narrow to provide any protection on the
international level. 2 68 The standard adopted should in some
respects address some of the concerns raised by Justice Brennan
in his dissent in Bartkus.2 69 In essence, the premise on which
barring a sequential prosecution using the broader sham
exception rests is that the two sovereigns are not working as
separate entities, but rather as one powerful sovereign with a
great number of resources directed at prosecuting one sole
defendant.
As such, any significant amount of cooperation
between sovereigns in prosecuting one defendant should provide
a basis for a valid double jeopardy claim predicated upon the idea
that when one sovereign enlists the help of a second sovereign
sharing concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute an individual, that
second sovereign waives its right to pursue prosecution at a later
point.
There is, however, a better, more practical solution that
bypasses the subjective need to ascertain how much cooperation
is sufficient to satisfy the sham exception.
Ultimately, the
success of global law enforcement efforts depends on the
increased level of international cooperation. This cooperation
should, therefore, extend to the prosecution itself. The adoption
of joint-prosecutions would enable the agencies of both sovereigns

267.
83 F.Supp. 2d at 96.
268.
Id. at 96.
269.
Justice Brennan proposed that a test should be fashioned to "secure
the fundamental protection of the Fifth Amendment 'that the Federal Government
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a state of
anxiety and insecurity." See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
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to contribute to the best presentation of evidence in a court
mutually agreed upon by the sovereign states. 27 0 Furthermore,
this scheme could be structured to allow all crimes arising out of
the same conduct or criminal transaction
to be joined together
271
and prosecuted in a single criminal trial.
In effect, this approach would serve as a more practical
international practice in that it allows each violated sovereign to
vindicate its own laws in a manner that would only subject the
accused to a single trial. Such a concept is not foreign to the
United States, as it has successfully executed this strategy with
countries such as Israel.2 72 Strategically, joint prosecutions may
significantly increase the chance that a defendant is convicted
because prosecutors from different nations will be able to
determine which jurisdiction will enhance
their probability of
2 73
convicting and punishing the defendant.
In the end, this approach is more practical in that it better
balances the interests of the sovereign states with those of the
individual defendant by preserving a defendant's right not to be
twice placed in jeopardy.
It also simultaneously promotes
cooperation by encouraging prosecutors to work together in order
27 4
to maximize their shared goal of further convicting defendants.
V. CONCLUSION

As we enter a new millennium, the traditional concept of
state sovereignty is in the process of being redefined. 27 5 Today,
the focus is on individual rights and not on protecting a state's
power to abuse those rights. 27 6 The United States therefore
cannot continue to cling unto an antiquated view of sovereignty
that from its inception was intended to places defendants in
double jeopardy contrary not only to Constitutional prohibitions

270.
Cf. Franck, supra note 244, at 1103 (discussing the single trial
proposal in the federal-state context).
271.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 57, at 505; see also Matz, supra note 84, at
174 (discussing this scheme in the federal-state context).
272.
See Abramovsky & Edelstein, supra note 263, at 314-315. The United
States has, on at least three occasions, assisted Israel in conducting jointprosecutions of criminal defendants. Id. In conducting several of these joint
prosecutions, the United States and Israel were able to establish several
procedures that will facilitate subsequent prosecutions by minimizing delays. Id.
273.
Cf.Hellmann, supra note 229, at 167 (discussing this prospect in the
federal-state context).
274.
Id.
275.
See Kofi Annan, Two Concepts of Sovereignty, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18
1999, at 49.
276.
Id.

2000]

Non Bis In Idem1

1303

against such an occurrence, but also to the internationally
2 77
accepted maxim non bis in idem.
In the end, it's a question of what is just. The multiple
prosecutions of the same defendant for the same conduct,
whether by the same or different sovereigns, is not only offensive,
but also contrary to the basic notions of justice inherent in all
people. 2 78 The Supreme Court of the United States has taken the
position that a second trial is somehow less offensive if it is
conducted by a second, independent sovereign. This approach,
however, should finally be eliminated in the international arena.
It has no foundation in history or practicality, and the basic
outcome is unjust and reprehensible. It is time that the United
States adopt a standard that continues to promote cooperation in
international law enforcement by providing a mechanism by
which to conduct international joint prosecutions. By adopting
such a standard, the United States would be able to pursue its
own penal interests while simultaneously preserving the rights of
defendants.
Ultimately, the United States would finally be
practicing what it has always preached-that no man would twice
be prosecuted for the same offense.
Dax EricLopez*

277. The principle of non bis in idem is "so obviously just, ... and so widely
approved in the world's legal systems that it hardly seems necessary to adduce
reasons in its support." Harvard Research in International Law, supranote 115, at
603.
278.
Fisher, supra note 101, at 598 ("It is all the same to the accused. From
his standpoint the situation is the same whether the successive prosecutions are
by the same or by different sovereignties; one is as bad as the other").
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